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The notion of time reversal has caused some recent controversy in philosophy of physics. The 
debate has mainly put the focus on how the concept of time reversal should be formally 
implemented across different physical theories and models, as if time reversal were a single, 
unified concept that physical theories should capture. In this paper, I shift the focus of the 
debate and defend that the concept of time reversal involves at least three facets, where each 
of them gives rise to opposing views. In particular, I submit that any account of time reversal 
presupposes (explicitly or implicitly) modal, metaphysical, and heuristic facets. The 
comprehension of this multi-faceted nature of time reversal, I conclude, shows that time 
reversal can be coherently said in many ways, suggesting a disunified concept. 
Keywords: Time Reversal, Symmetry, Physical Laws, Modality, Time 
1. Introduction 
Symmetries play a paramount role not only in physical theories, but also in facing many 
fundamental philosophical problems in philosophy of physics and metaphysics (Nozick 2001, 
Baker 2010, Dasgupta 2016). Time-reversal symmetry, in particular, has increasingly drawn 
physicists’ and philosophers’ attention for mainly two reasons. First, it is relevant to address some 
long-standing philosophical queries around the nature of time (for instance, whether it manifests a 
privileged direction or not, see Horwich 1987, Price 1996, Arntzenius 1997). Second, it has proved 
to be crucial in empirical research as well as in guiding theory construction (Sachs 1987, 
Kleinknecht 2003, Sozzi 2008, Caulton 2016), which highlights its explanatory value in the 
foundations of physics. In addition, a recent philosophical discussion focuses on the meaning of 
time reversal in different physical theories, on how it must be interpreted and defined in general 
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and in particular cases (see, for instance, Savitt 1996, Albert 2000, Callender 2000, Earman 2004, 
Malament 2004, North 2008, Roberts 2017, Lopez 2019 among many others). 
Regardless of how fertile such literature has been for philosophy and foundations of physics, 
it generally promotes a univocal analysis. The literature has mainly put the focus on how the 
concept of time reversal should be formally implemented across different physical theories and 
models1, as if time reversal were a single, unified concept that physical theories should capture 
and formally implement. So, efforts have been primarily devoted to work out the right 
representation of such a unified concept in physical theories. The aim of this paper is to shift the 
focus of the debate and defend that the concept of time reversal involves at least three facets rather 
than one, where each facet leaves room for opposing views and philosophical commitments with 
respect to time reversal in physics. This, I will argue, leads to alternative conceptualizations of 
time reversal, and consequently, to a much less unified conceptual basis. Alternative 
representations and implementations might then be genuinely viable. 
The three facets of time reversal and, consequently, its disunity come out from three questions 
that may be given different answers: 
(i) Is time-reversal symmetry predicated of general dynamical laws or particular models?  
(ii) Is time to be understood relationally or substantively? 
(iii) Is time-reversal symmetry stipulated or discovered in physical theories? 
Each question reveals a facet of time reversal that undermines any monolithic conceptual unity. I 
will contend that the first question involves a modal facet since it concerns a distinction between 
symmetries of the laws versus symmetries of solutions (Section 2). The second question reveals a 
metaphysical facet since it leads to paying attention to the metaphysics of time underlying the 
notion of time reversal (Section 3). Finally, the last question shows a heuristic facet since it deals 
with two opposing views on the status of symmetries in physics –a by stipulation and a by-
discovery view (Section 4). Each question will admit alternative answers, steering in consequence 
our understanding of time reversal towards different directions. I will show this by providing some 
concrete cases. 
2. Modal Facet: Symmetry of Solutions versus Symmetry of the Laws 
The first question of this multi-facet analysis of time reversal is: 
Is time-reversal predicated of general dynamical laws or particular models? 
In physics, it is common to speak of the symmetry group of a theory. For instance, it is said that 
non-relativistic quantum mechanics is Galilei invariant since it is invariant under the 
 
1 See for instance the debate about whether time reversal is implemented by an anti-unitary or unitary operator in 
quantum theories (Callender 2000, Roberts 2017, Lopez 2019); or about whether it should change the sign of 
magnetic field in classical electromagnetism (Albert 2000, Arntzenius and Greaves 2009), 
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transformations of the Galilei group. Relativistic quantum mechanics is non-invariant under the 
Galilei group, but it turns out to be invariant under the Poincaré group. Yet, it is common to also 
speak of the symmetries of a theory when the symmetry transformation does not belong to a 
theory’s group. Time reversal is a paradigmatic case, but there are many others (i.e., parity). In 
both cases, a symmetry is predicated of a theory, in particular, of its dynamical equations –If a 
physical theory remains symmetric under some transformation, this is so because its laws come 
out invariant under such a symmetry transformation. In this sense, I will say that a symmetry is a 
property of the laws. 
However, it is also common to enquire whether a specific model (or a specific system) is 
symmetric under a given transformation. In this sense, for instance, it is said that a certain 
Lagrangian is symmetric under a symmetry transformation if it does not change the value of the 






is invariant under a transformation that shifts the coordinate 𝑞 by an amount of 𝛿, 𝑆: 𝑞 → 𝑞 + 𝛿. 
So, in this case, we can assert that this Lagrangian is spatial-translation invariant and when initial 
conditions are added, the specific Lagrange equation will yield spatial-translation invariant 
solutions. However, if we consider a slightly more complex system, for instance the trajectory of 
a particle through an inhomogeneous field, then the value of the Lagrangian will surely change as 
𝑞 is shifted. Therefore, this second Lagrangian will be non-spatial-translation invariant and so will 
be the solutions to the specific Lagrange equation. From this perspective, however, a symmetry is 
not predicated of the general equation, but of the models (or of the solutions) of the dynamical 
equations; models that not only involve dynamical features, but also some non-nomic ones (for 
instance, boundary conditions, potentials, approximations, and so on). One point to stress here is 
that a failure of invariance for specific models could be caused either by the dynamics of a theory 
or by some non-nomic feature (for instance, a very special initial condition). 
This ambiguity, when it comes to the subject of symmetry predication, is captured by a 
distinction neatly drawn by Katherine Brading and Elena Castellani between symmetries of 
solutions (or of models) and symmetries of laws. In their words: 
“we must distinguish between symmetries of objects versus symmetries of laws 
(…). It is one thing to ask about the geometric symmetries of certain objects (…) 
and the asymmetries of objects (…). It is another thing to ask about the symmetries 
of the laws governing the time-evolution of those objects (…). Re-phrasing the 
same point, we should distinguish between symmetries of states or solutions, versus 
symmetries of laws” (2003: 1381). 
The distinction remains valid for time reversal: we can say either that a dynamical equation is time-
reversal invariant, or that a specific model of such an equation is. Olimpia Lombardi and Mario 
Castagnino (2009) have drawn a similar distinction in order to distinguish reversibility from time-
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reversal invariance –whereas time-reversal invariance is predicated of laws (mathematically 
represented by dynamical equations), (ir)reversibility is predicated of evolutions of the laws 
(mathematically represented by solutions of the dynamical equations).  In my view, the distinction 
is not really about the meaning of reversibility or time-reversal invariance, but about whether we 
are regarding time reversal in relation to general laws (with few or no interactions) or to particular 
models (given by more specific laws, frequently involving more interactions). In this light, I claim, 
the difference is actually about their modal scope: when time-reversal invariance is predicated of 
a dynamical equation the assertion is meant to be modally stronger for it involves what is or isn’t 
physically possible within a theory. When it is rather predicated of a specific model, its modal 
scope is much weaker because the (a)symmetry generally rests upon particular features of that 
model. In revealing a modal facet in the notion of time reversal, the distinction becomes relevant 
for some philosophical debates that strongly depend on the notion of time reversal –i.e., the debate 
about the arrow of time. 
To see the distinction clearly, consider Huw Price’s intuitive corkscrew analogy (1996). Price 
proposes us to imagine a factory that generates equal number of left-handed and right-handed 
corkscrews. There are two points on which we may want to focus. The first one is whether the 
production of corkscrews is symmetric. The second, whether an individual corkscrew is (spatially) 
symmetric or not. Price’s analogy aims to show that, as there is no mystery whatsoever in having 
a symmetric production of left-handed and right-handed corkscrews and spatially asymmetric 
individual corkscrews, there is not mystery either in having time-reversal invariant laws and 
asymmetric models (see Price 1996: 88, 96). Otherwise stated, the mystery fades away when it is 
left clear we are dealing with two distinct sorts of questions. In particular, the difference resides in 
that we are attributing the predicate ‘being time-reversal symmetric’ to two different items. In the 
first case, we predicate ‘time-reversal invariance’ of general laws (mathematically represented, in 
general, by differential dynamical equations), whereas in the second case the predicate is attributed 
to a particular evolution of the laws (mathematically represented by a solution of a differential 
dynamical equation). So, the differences in symmetry predication go hand-in-hand with 
differences between laws and their solutions. Let us get into more details. 
Consider Hamiltonian classical mechanics. Any solution of Hamilton’s equations can be 
represented by a time-parametrized curve in the phase space (Γ) 
 
ℰ = 𝑠𝑡 ∈ Γ ∶ 𝑡𝑖 ≤ 𝑡 ≤  𝑡𝑓 (2) 
The class of trajectories allowed by Hamilton’s equations represents the class of its possible worlds 
Ⱳ (or models), that is, those worlds wherein the laws are (approximately) true. The question 
whether or not Hamilton’s equations are time-reversal invariant is the question of whether the 
equations generate (or produce) two symmetric subclasses of solutions, say,  Ⱳ𝑓  and Ⱳ𝑏  (or time-
symmetric twins, see Castagnino and Lombardi 2009). In addition, we require that if the laws are 
time-reversal invariant, then there exists a transformation T that maps solutions in Ⱳ𝑓  onto 
solutions in Ⱳ𝑏 . The existence of the map ℰ →𝑇  ℰ𝑇 then secures that Ⱳ𝑏  keeps some structural 
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or empirical equivalence2 with respect to Ⱳ𝑓. It follows from this that for any evolution ℰ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓  
there will be a structurally or empirically equivalent time-reversed evolution ℰ𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏  
 
ℰ𝑇 = 𝑇𝑠𝑡 ∈ 𝛤 ∶ −𝑡𝑓 ≤ 𝑡𝑛 ≤  −𝑡𝑖 (3) 
And here the analogy is: as corkscrew factories produce a symmetric amount of left-handed 
and right-handed corkscrews, classical dynamical laws generate pairs of time-symmetric 
evolution, that is, those ℰ ∈ Ⱳ𝑓  and those ℰ𝑇 ∈ Ⱳ𝑏 . The consequence of this reasoning is that 
time-reversal as a symmetry of the laws involves a strong modal element: what kind of trajectories 
are allowed by a theory’s dynamic marks off what is physically possible and what is not in relation 
to the chosen direction of time. To put it differently, an assertion of time-reversal invariance (or a 
failure thereof) says something about the whole class of solutions of a theory’s dynamics; it says 
that if an evolution ℰ𝑘 is obtained, then it is physically possible (or impossible) to obtain a time-
reversed evolution structurally or empirically equivalent, ℰ𝑘
𝑇. So, time reversal as a symmetry of 
the laws says something about the temporality of all possible models of the theory. 
However, this says nothing about whether a specific trajectory is symmetric under time 
reversal or not. This happens because an evolution also involves non-nomic elements that 
characterize it (and, even more, identify it). Even though a trajectory may be generated by a time-
reversal invariant law, the trajectory itself can be asymmetric under the reversion of the direction 
of time. Terms can be a bit confusing here and that is why some authors, as I mentioned before, 
prefer to talk about symmetry of the laws (as detailed above) in terms of time-reversal invariance, 
and about symmetry of the solutions in terms of reversibility (Price 1996 seems to be suggesting 
an akin distinction, Castagnino and Lombardi 2009 are clearer on this point). Be that as it may, 
non-nomic factors (as initial/final conditions) matter in determining whether a specific evolution 
is symmetric or not and can well explain why the model is asymmetric despite being generated by 
a time symmetric dynamics. But note that any symmetry assertion in terms of a symmetry of a 
solution is only valid for that solution and cannot be extended to other possibilities. In this sense, 
a symmetry assertion in terms of a symmetry of a solution is contingent, and thereby, much 
narrower in modal scope than a symmetry assertion related to general laws. In sum, whereas time 
reversal as a symmetry of the laws relates to the modal structure of a physical theory because it 
circumscribes what is temporally possible and what is not for a theory’s dynamics, time reversal 
as a symmetry of a solution just characterizes the actual temporal properties of a particular world 
(or model) and cannot be extended any further. 
This distinction, which may seem to be merely linguistic at first sight, is actually significant 
from a philosophical point of view. A clear case of that is the problem of the arrow of time, which 
has largely relied upon the notion of time reversal. The modal distinction between time reversal as 
 
2 Though I will here refer simply to empirical or structural equivalence, I acknowledge that a purely formal relation 
does not exhaust the meaning of a symmetry and it needs to be given with further constraints. However, which such 
constraints are has been matter of some controversy (see Belot 2013 and Dasgupta 2016). 
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a symmetry of the laws and as a symmetry of a solution introduces a distinction between two 
qualitatively different arrows of time. As above, there are now two questions related to time 
reversal and the arrow of time. One is whether a theory’s dynamics treats the past-to-future 
direction (conventionally, 𝑡+) and the future-to-past direction (𝑡−) differently. This is a question 
aimed at the dynamical equations of a theory and should be replied by their formal and structural 
features. The second is whether a specific model of a theory (for instance, the history of our 
universe, or this particular Hamiltonian in an inhomogeneous field) can be equally described with 
time running either backward or forward. This question is not exclusively aimed at a theory’s 
dynamics, but also at other non-nomic factors that might play an imporant role in characterizing 
the model. Any arrow of time (or any rejection of it) we can extract from both questions are 
modally different, because they relate to items of a theory that vary in modal scope. 
Let us take the case of the thermodynamic arrow of time. On the one hand, (isolated) 
thermodynamic systems evidently exhibit temporal biases as their entropies always increase. On 
the other, their mechanical reformulations are unable to capture such a feature, and the time 
asymmetry can only be explained, at best, statistically. The reason for this is that the mechanical 
equations of statistical classical mechanics are time-reversal invariant (in either of its 
formulations), so for any entropy-increasing model, we can obtain a time-reversed entropy-
decreasing model. There are many arguments of this sort (commonly known as “reversible 
objections”) casting doubts on any intended reduction of thermodynamics to statistical classical 
mechanics. But these arguments go much farther than intended as they have also casted doubts on 
the explanation of the thermodynamic arrow of time in a mechanical setting. Evidently, if the 
underlying dynamics of macroscopic phenomena is given by the classical equation of motions and 
these turn out to be time-reversal invariant, there is a fundamental sense in which the classical 
world lacks a direction of time. So, the problem is now how to explain the evident thermodynamic 
time asymmetry in terms of a directionless dynamics. 
We can now rephrase this debate in modal terms using the corkscrew analogy: the equations 
of statistical classical mechanics are the factories that produce pairs of entropy-increasing models 
and entropy-decreasing models. This follows from the fact that they are time-reversal invariant. 
Here comes the first question: does classical statistical mechanics treat the past-to-future direction 
(conventionally, 𝑡+) and the future-to-past direction (𝑡−) differently? No, it doesn’t. Nothing in 
the dynamics allows us to break the balance between entropy-increasing and entropy-decreasing 
models. In this sense, the theory is modally committed to rejecting any fundamental arrow of time 
–it is always dynamically possible to bring up a time-reversed model that satisfies the classical 
mechanical equations of motion. This symmetry declaration is, without any further addendum, 
valid for any model: nothing in its inner dynamics will be responsible for a time asymmetry.  
To be clear about this, think of an inverse scenario, one in which a theory’s dynamics turns out 
non-time-reversal invariant. What such a dynamics tells us is that the set of solutions is either Ⱳ𝑓  
or Ⱳ𝑏 , but cannot be both. In this case, every model will exhibit a time asymmetry that comes 
from the non-existence of a structurally or empirically equivalent model, regardless its initial or 
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boundary conditions, or any non-nomic factor that might characterize it. So, we can say that in 
such a case we have a quite good reason to declare that an arrow of time is necessary for that theory 
for the set of its possible models (or worlds) is either Ⱳ𝑓 or Ⱳ𝑏 . 
Let us come back to the time-reversal invariant statistical classical mechanics. Whereas no 
time asymmetry can come from its dynamics, it is blatant that some classical models will be time 
asymmetric (in fact, most of them). Here comes the second question: does this model (with all its 
features, both nomic and non-nomic) equally allow descriptions with time running forward and 
backward? If the answer is negative, where do such temporal asymmetries come then from? There 
might be many answers to this, but one that has been quite popular (and controversial in equal 
degree) among philosophers and physicists is the so-called Past Hypothesis (see Albert 2000, Ch. 
4). In a nutshell, the Past Hypothesis postulates very special initial conditions that, with some 
further assumptions, can explain temporal asymmetries, recover our temporally biased epistemic 
access to evidence, and delivers the right thermodynamic predictions. All this despite having time-
reversal invariant laws (for details, see Albert 2000, Callender 2000, Loewer 2012; for discussion, 
see Price 1996, Earman 2006 and Wallace 2011).  The trick is that any probability distribution at 
any point of an evolution must be conditionalized over the Past Hypothesis. But it should be 
stressed that the Past Hypothesis provides an explanation of why a particular model of a physical 
theory (model that can be the history of our universe) is time asymmetric, but it says nothing about 
other possible models allowed by the theory. In this particular case, we obtain an explanation of 
why a model is time asymmetric; an explanation that strongly relies on non-dynamical elements 
that characterizes this model, which cannot be extended further than that. The so-obtained time 
asymmetry, or arrow of time, is hence modally weaker –it is an arrow of time stemmed from an 
asymmetry of a solution, not of a law. 
Summing up. I have shown that time-reversal symmetry can be predicated either of general 
laws or of particular models. This distinction in symmetry predication reveals a modal facet: 
whereas a symmetry of general laws relates to what is physically possible and what is, a symmetry 
of a particular model is much more modally circumscribed as it greatly depends upon some inner 
non-nomic features of a model. When applied to the problem of the arrow of time in 
thermodynamics and classical mechanics, this modal facet shows not only that there is no 
contradiction between having time-reversal invariant general laws and time-reversal asymmetric 
models, but also, that there is a modal difference between an arrow of time stemmed from a time-
reversal asymmetry of a specific model (for instance, one satisfying the Past Hypothesis) and an 
arrow of time stemmed from non-time-reversal invariant laws. 
3. Metaphysical Facet: Relationalism versus Substantivalism 
Time reversal is intended to act upon time and to reverse it. But, 
Is time to be understood relationally or substantively? 
8 
 
This question relates to a broader one: what do we mean by ‘time’? To provide an answer to these 
questions, I claim, we should dig into an (overlooked) metaphysical facet in our understanding of 
time reversal. The motivation of this inquiry is simple: our metaphysical understanding of time 
determines our conceptualization and modelling of the time-reversal transformation –If we are said 
to invert the direction of time, our course of actions will be different depending on what time is. 
And in this sense the metaphysics of time comes first: It determines not only what time reversal is 
but also upon what it is supposed to act. I have suggested elsewhere (Lopez 2019) that our 
metaphysics of time plays an active role in modelling the time-reversal operator in quantum 
mechanics. Here I submit that this is not exclusive of quantum mechanics but a more general facet 
of any conceptualization of time reversal in physics3. 
There are at least two metaphysical views on time in philosophy –relationalism (or 
reductionism) and substantivalism (primitivism). The substantivalist holds that time is something 
real that exists independently of events and things placed within it. In addition, she defends that 
time should be considered primitive in one’s fundamental ontology, being consequently 
irreducible to anything else. Alternatively, the relationalist supports the idea that time is an abstract 
notion stemmed from events, things and their (temporal) relations. In other words, there is nothing 
like time that it is not already in the dynamical features of things or events. The relationalist thus 
promotes a reductionist view of time –any temporal predicate can be ultimately boiled down to 
physical predicates related to the things’ changing. Let’s see all this in more detail. 
Even though substantivalism and relationalism come in many flavors, there are some 
distinctive features that identify them and distinguish from one another. For substantivalists, time 
(or space-time) exists independently of events and material things. In virtue of this, time 
instantiates properties over and above the properties those events, or material things instantiate. 
Two main substantivalist tenets can be drawn from here: 
S1 A dualist ontology. There are two types of primitives in the substantivalist 
ontology: material things or events and time (or space-time). 
S2 Independence and irreducibility. Time’s properties do not depend upon, nor can 
be reduced to, events’ or material things’ properties. 
Contrarily, relationalists reduce the structure of time to the structure of change, which may be 
qualified differently. The relationalist lesson is that any property ascribed to time is ultimately 
reducible to a property attributed to events or the material things’ changing. As before, two tenets: 
R1 A monist ontology. There are only events or material things in the world plus their 
(spatial) temporal relations. 
R2 Dependence and reductionism. Time’s properties are reducible to events’ or 
material things’ properties. In this sense, the former metaphysically depends upon 
the latter. Consequently, any temporal parlance is nothing but a parlance about 
change. In a slogan: Time is nothing but change. 
 
3 I even think that this is not excusive of time-reversal invariance either, but a feature of any spatial-temporal 
symmetry. I will not develop this point further here, but I believe that the same point can be made for spatial 
symmetries (i.e., space reflection) as well. 
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I opened this section claiming that the metaphysics of time comes first since it determines not only 
what time reversal is but also upon what it is supposed to act. This rather abstract assertion can be 
now fleshed out in terms of these metaphysical views. The point is that substantivalists and 
relationalists could diverge over what time reversal is because they diverge over what time is and 
over the place it occupies in one’s ontology. Consequently, they could conceptualize time reversal 
differently. 
For the substantivalist, time reversal is primarily a reversion of that primitive entity we name 
‘time’ and of its intrinsic property related to its directionality (see Maudlin 2002). There is no 
metaphysical basis in the substantivalist’s framework for time reversal to mean something 
different than a reversion of the direction of time itself (see North 2008: 212). Neither is there any 
place for a reductio of time reversal to any other transformation. Whatever we mean by time 
reversal, it is to be metaphysically exhausted by representing a reversion of time itself –any 
maneuver that intends to circumvent such a principle can, rightfully to my mind, be rejected by 
the substantivalist in terms of a relationalist maneuver.  
The next natural step is thus to provide a scheme for a substantivalist representation of time 
reversal. To begin, if time reversal chiefly intends to reverse the direction of time, any time reversal 
transformation will then represent a transformation applied upon time itself. This can be 
straightforwardly implemented by the usual transformation, 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡. The controversy now is 
how it must be interpreted and which its relevance is when it comes to understand time reversal. 
In the majority of physical theories, time is an external parameter (t). Under a substantivalist 
reading, it exists and instantiates properties that are independent of the physical bodies. So, such a 
transformation encodes to a good extent what (substantival) time reversal is –just a reversion of 
the direction of time itself. A further step may be to stipulate that such a transformation generates 
a series of subsidiary dynamical transformations of those magnitudes that intrinsically depend 
upon the variable t. To be clear: a dynamical magnitude will transform under time reversal if and 
only if it bears an intrinsic dependence upon time (i.e., if the magnitude is a first-time derivative). 
It is worth noting that which magnitudes will change their sign under time reversal is a theory-
relative issue. 
The nature of time reversal for the relationalist looks quite different. To begin with, the 
transformation 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 should not be taken literally, as t is just an abstract parameter that does 
not stand for any item in a relational ontology. In her view, 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡  is nothing but a 
reparameterization of the time coordinate. So what? Here the reductionist attitude comes into play: 
a relationalist metaphysics of time implies that any temporal predicate, as for instance any 
reference to the ‘directionality of time’, should not be taken literally as if there were some primitive 
entity exemplifying the property of directionality. Rather, it should be taken metaphorically –the 
‘directionality of time’ boils down to the directionality of the change of a series of temporal 
relations held by their relata. In consequence, time reversal is just a metaphor, so to speak, of a 
more fundamental transformation. What the relationalist has to find out is which it is the right sort 
of transformation that realizes time reversal within a physical theory. 
How should the relationalist pursue this task then? First and foremost, it must be left clear that 
what is really substantive in the understanding of time reversal is not the transformation of time 
itself (for it is metaphysically nothing), but the transformation of change. This suggests that ‘time 
reversal’ should be considered a linguistic “shortcut” standing for dynamically relevant 
transformations related to the change (or motion) of a system. The directionality of time is, hence, 
nothing but the directionality of change. A reversion of the directionality of time is, therefore, 
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nothing but a reversion of the directionality of change. To put it in a slogan: time reversal is nothing 
but change reversal. Actually, this is the overarching attitude grounding the physical justification 
and guiding various implementations of time reversal in physical theories: the formal 
representation ultimately must capture the idea of reversing the change, whatever it comes to mean 
within a physical theory (see, for instance, Wigner 1932: 325, Gibson and Pollard 1976: 177, 
Ballentine 1998: 377).  
All this already delivers a general impression of what a (relationalist) time-reversal 
transformation should do and act upon. Besides the unphysical reparameterization of t, reversing 
the direction of time will be reversing those magnitudes that play a relevant dynamical role in an 
evolution. In particular, reversing those magnitudes in such a way that can formally represent a 
physical system evolving backward. To be emphatic: it is not the case that time reversal (somehow) 
produces a change in the sign of some magnitudes as if they were some subsidiary effects of 
reversing time, but that time reversal is such specific transformations.  
Two points are worthy of mention. First, the metaphysical facet of time reversal is partially 
independent of its physical and formal implementation. By this I mean that both metaphysical 
stances are committed to different conceptualizations of time reversal, but this does not per se 
entail that each of them finds a straightforward implementation within a physical theory or yields 
the same results (i.e., both keeping the same equations and models invariant under time reversal). 
It may not be so. If any of these metaphysical views leads to an untenable implementation of time 
reversal within a physical theory, this might lead (or not) to revise one’s metaphysics, but it does 
not refute the thesis that metaphysical commitments with respect to time determine our 
understanding of time reversal. Neither does it immediately imply that there was ultimately just 
one correct view, because it was the only physically viable. 
Second, as I mentioned above, both views might entail implementations of time reversal that 
transform equations and models differently, and thereby, that render the same equations invariant 
and non-invariant. This is, of course, a quite interesting result, which deserves further 
philosophical inquiry. However, whether or not two distinct time-reversal transformations disagree 
on whether a given equation is left invariant, it is not crucial for the point I want to stress. What it 
is crucial is the way in which they justify the properties of the time reversal transformation, 
regardless whether they deliver the same result or not. Let us see a concrete example to shed light 
on this. Think of how time reversal transforms momentum in Newtonian classical mechanics. 
Momentum is canonically defined as 
 𝑝 = 𝑚. 𝑣 (4) 
The question of ‘how momentum transforms under time reversal’, I claim, should firstly be 
addressed by making explicit which metaphysics of time we endorse. So, there are two alternatives 
on the table –either we are asking how momentum transform under the relational time reversal or 
under substantival time reversal. If the former, we will seek for the transformation that backtracks 
the Newtonian system to its original state, because time reversal is nothing but the action that 
generates such a backward evolution. So, we can rightfully declare that the transformation 
 𝑇: 𝑝 → −𝑝 (5) 
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is part of the very definition of time reversal as it plays an essential role in generating the backward 
evolution. As it is part of the definition, it does not require further justification. 
The substantivalist can declare that the substantival time-reversal transformation changes the 
momentum’s sign, agreeing with the relationalist. But the reasons of this agreement are different. 
For her, time reversal means a change of the direction of time itself, which is primarily given by  
 𝑇: 𝑡 → −𝑡 (6) 
Now, she can deduce that, since momentum strongly depends on time as it definitionally depends 
on velocity (which is a first-time derivative), time reversal entails the change of the momentum’s 
sign. This does not mean that time reversal is defined by the transformation of the momentum’s 
sign, but that a previously given definition of time reversal entails such a transformation. And this 
previously given definition was determined by having adopted a substantivalist metaphysics of 
time. To be clear: the results are the same, but they are contingently the same in so much as the 
justifications of the results rest upon different bases. Naturally, that the results converge within a 
theory does not mean that they will converge in a different theory (see Lopez 2019 for a case where 
they might not converge). 
Summing up. I have argued that properties of the time-reversal transformation, both formally 
and physically, depend upon one’s metaphysics of time. This shows a metaphysical facet in our 
understanding of time reversal in physics that admits of different answers. This fact leads to, at 
least, two quite different concepts of time reversal. In particular, I contrasted a relationalist-
reductionist metaphysics of time with a substantivalist-primitive. The upshot was that both 
philosophical stances may disagree on what time reversal is and upon what it should act because 
they disagree on what time is. This facet, I have claimed, chiefly concerns the justification to 
incorporate certain magnitude transformations either as definitions or effects of time reversal. In 
addition, this facet is not idiosyncratic of concrete cases, but pervades time reversal in physics. 
4. Heuristic Facet: By-stipulation versus By-discovery Symmetries. 
In this section, I will address a third facet of time reversal. Whereas the metaphysical facet 
primarily puts the focus on the time-reversal transformation (what we metaphysically and 
physically mean by ‘time reversing’), this facet rather centers in the status of symmetries in 
physics. To be precise, it centers in whether symmetries act as rule-prescribing principles (or 
constraints) for a dynamic or not. The question related to this facet is: 
Is time-reversal symmetry stipulated or discovered in physical theories? 
My claim is that this question can be answered from two opposing views with respect to 
symmetries in physics. One of them, which I will call by-stipulation, takes symmetries as 
postulated, being true independently of the details of the dynamics. The other, which I will call by-
discovery, takes symmetries as a result of the details of the dynamics. In the former case, 
symmetries constrain the dynamic. In the latter, they depend on it. Even though each view 
comprehends metaphysical and epistemic theses, this facet is called “heuristic” because the view 
to be taken determines the theoretical status of time-reversal symmetry in a physical theory, and 
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thereby, rules to a good extent the conceptualization and formal implementation of the time-
reversal transformation in a physical theory. 
What does justify the distinction between by-stipulation and by-discovery symmetries? 
Brading and Castellani note that some symmetry principles (mainly, space-time symmetries) seem 
to be used as guides to theory construction. That is, principles that must be satisfied whatever the 
final details of the theory come to be. The mechanism whereby a symmetry is raised to a principle 
that must be satisfied is that of stipulation –we postulate, independently of the details of a theory’s 
dynamics, that a given symmetry holds, and then that the dynamic must adapt to the symmetries’ 
constraints. When laying the groundwork for Bohmian Mechanics, Dettlef Dürr and Stephan 
Teufel for instance write 
“A symmetry can be a priori, i.e., the physical law is built in such a way that it respects 
that particular symmetry by construction. This is exemplified by spacetime 
symmetries, because spacetime is the theater in which the physical law acts (as long 
as spacetime is not subject to a law itself, as in general relativity, which we exclude 
from our considerations here), and must therefore respect the rules of the theater”. 
(2009: 43-44)  
It is worth contrasting this quote to others we can find in the literature on symmetries. John 
Earman says 
“The received wisdom about the status of symmetry principles has it that one must 
confront a choice between the a posteriori approach (a.k.a. the bottom up approach) 
versus the a priori approach (a.k.a. the top down approach)”. (2004: 1230) 
Earman’s distinction is in keeping with Brading and Castellani’s (2007): whereas some take 
symmetries as postulated, guiding theory construction, others seem to follow an opposite trend, 
according to which symmetries are a consequence of specific laws –like a discovery (2007: 1347). 
The idea of postulating a symmetry suggests certain degree of necessity for some aspects of a 
physical theory: its dynamics must satisfy the postulated symmetries. Interestingly, Earman (1989) 
mentions that symmetry principles are frequently considered contingent, rather than necessary. In 
discussing active and passive symmetry transformations in relationalist and substantivalists 
frameworks, Earman claims that the relationalist is committed to a passive reading, where the 
symmetry transformation connects different descriptions, being all of them equally accurate. But, 
if this is so, then: 
“it would seem that the symmetry transformation could not fail to be a true symmetry 
of nature, contradicting the usual understanding that symmetry principles are 
contingent, that is, are true (or false) without being necessarily true (or false)” (1989: 
121. Emphasis mine) 
What all these quotes make clear is that there are, implicitly or explicitly, at least two opposing 
approaches to the theoretical status of symmetries in physics, which naturally involves time-
reversal invariance as well.  
However, all these characterizations look like a grab-bag of concepts. They resort on predicates 
like “necessary”, “contingent”, “a priori”, “a posteriori”, “being postulated or known before”, 
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“being discovered and known after”, and so forth. It is thus not fully clear what the difference is, 
specifically. So, let us start by sorting things out.  
To begin, the predicates “being necessary” and “being contingent” are metaphysical. These 
can be spelled out variedly, but a standard way to do it is by adopting the possible-world parlance, 
a) 𝑥 is necessarily 𝛷 if and only if 𝑥 is 𝛷 in every possible world wherein x exists.  
b) 𝑥 is contingently 𝛷 if and only if 𝑥 is 𝛷 in some possible worlds, but it lacks 𝛷 in others. 
Yet, the predicates “being a priori/posteriori” are rather epistemic –they are standardly defined in 
terms of whether something is known independently of experience. In which sense might a 
symmetry be a priori or a posteriori? If we take the terms strictly, that is, in relation to our 
experience, then the distinction does not make much sense for symmetries. From an abstract 
viewpoint, a symmetry 𝜎 (as a symmetry of the laws, see Section 2) is a property of a mathematical 
structure 𝔈 –that is, a set of objects 𝑂 equipped with relations 𝑅𝑖, and functions 𝑓𝑗, such that 𝜎 is 
an automorphism that maps 𝑂 onto itself 𝜎: 𝑂 → 𝑂 that preserves all of the relations and functions 
among objects in 𝔈 . For physical theories, the implementation of this definition involves 
differential equations along with their space of solutions, and we say that a symmetry is a one-to-
one mapping that preserves the space of its solutions (see Section 2). Whether a dynamical 
equation is symmetric or not then depends on the sort of formal relations held by the elements 
within it. And this is something we always know independently of the experience. Therefore, it is 
always a priori in the strict sense. Symmetries may have an experimental manifestation, but this 
happens a fortiori and it is not independent of the theory (which, one way or another, already 
includes the symmetry in its dynamics). For instance, experimentally we might discover that a 
symmetry has been broken. But the symmetry itself is not derived from experience (see Healey 
2009 for discussion). So, no workable epistemic distinction between a priori and a posteriori seems 
to apply. 
I propose, notwithstanding the previous remark, that the a priori/a posteriori distinction could 
still be of some philosophical usage, if relaxed. The debate here is not about whether symmetries 
are known independently of experience but known independently of the dynamics. And so, I think, 
Earman’s and Dürr and Teufel’s words should be understood. Also, this fits well with the idea that 
symmetries are either postulated or discovered, as Brading and Castellani put it. So, in this more 
liberal reading of the distinction, we can say a symmetry 𝜎 is 
(i) A priori if it is known independently of the dynamic of the theory.  
(ii) A posteriori if its knowledge depends on the dynamic’s details. 
The predicates “being necessary” and “being contingent” now can be better interpreted as 
follows 
(a) 𝜎 is a necessary symmetry of T if there is no possible world wherein 𝑇 is true and non-𝜎-
invariant.  
If 𝜎 is postulated before the dynamics is given, then there is no possible world where such 
dynamics does not satisfy that symmetry. In this sense, it is necessary since it is required by the 
very formulation of the dynamics –the symmetry would be a necessary property of the physical 
theory in so far as it was built under the assumption wherever 𝑇 is true, it is 𝜎-symmetric.  
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(b) 𝜎 is a contingent symmetry of 𝑇 if there is at least one possible world wherein T is true and 
non-𝜎-invariant.  
If symmetries are known (or discovered) depending on dynamics’ details, nothing prima facie 
indicates that they must be considered as necessary for a physical theory –it can either have or lack 
symmetries. It is worth emphasizing that there is no strict entailment between either kind of 
predicates, but they seem to go hand-in-hand, in this case, when their meanings are relaxed4. The 
two approaches can hence be characterized as following: 
By-stipulation approach 𝜎-symmetry must be regarded as a priori and necessary for a theory 
T 
By-discovery approach 𝜎-symmetry must be regarded as a posteriori and contingent for a 
theory T 
To be clear. Even though both approaches rely on metaphysical and epistemic theses, the heuristic 
facet puts the focus on how these assumptions serve as a basis for symmetries to ultimately act 
either as a rule-prescribing framework guiding the construction of a theory’s dynamic, or as 
subsidiary consequences of an already-given dynamic.  
This is a bit more evident when the justifications of each approach are taken into consideration. 
For instance, Robert Sachs claims that the stipulation of time-reversal invariance is required for 
the purpose of expressing explicitly the independence between the kinematics and the nature of 
the forces (Sachs 1987: 7). Consequently, he seems to be defending a by-stipulation approach to 
time-reversal symmetry in the sense of serving as a rule-prescribing principle to distinguish the 
kinematics from the dynamic. Others rely on a beforehand favored platonic view of time and space, 
which are ideally directionless (Dürr and Teufel 2009: 47). In this view, time-reversal symmetry 
is also stipulated heuristically to guide theory construction. More radically, some just declare that 
time and space are not physically real but belong to conventional geometrical frameworks from 
which we describe what is physically real (closer to any moderate o radical relational view, see 
Rovelli 2004). In this view, it is highly desirable that all reference systems be equivalent, 
motivating highly symmetrical formulations of physical theories. All these views, directly or 
indirectly, favor a by-stipulation approach –we are entitled to stipulate that time reversal must hold 
in some privileged cases, to wit, those where forces, fields and interactions vanish. From this 
stipulated time-reversal symmetric basis, we can understand “emerging” temporal asymmetries, 
largely due to forces’, fields’ and interactions’ properties5. Note that the modelling of time reversal 
 
4 Under this more liberal reading of necessity/contingency and its relation to a priori/a posteriori, necessity and a priori 
seems to come along as well as contingency and a posteriori. Under a stricter reading, there would be two further 
relations I left out: between a priori and contingency, on the one hand, and between a posteriori and necessity, on the 
other. For this particular case, I do not see that any of these combinations yields a conceptually fruitful notion of time 
reversal. However, in general, Saul Kripke (1980) has persuasively argued for the existence of genuine cases. A 
proposition like “the length of stick S at time 𝑡0 is one meter” would be a priori and contingent (where “the length of 
S” is a non-rigid designator and “one meter” is so, being hence contingent; but it is obvious that the claim is knowable 
a priori at least for those users that stipulates the reference of “one meter”). A proposition like “gold is the element 
with atomic number 79” would be a posteriori and necessary (under the assumption that elements have essences and 
it is a science’s task to discover them). 
5 It is worth noticing how these approaches somehow relate to the modal facet. A by-stipulation approach will claim 
that general laws must be time-reversal invariant, but it allows some of their models to be time-reversal asymmetric. 
In this case, the general laws are those that are necessarily and a priori symmetric, not their models, which could be 
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must in consequence adapt to such constraints since how dynamical magnitudes transform under 
time reversal are subjected to such constraints. 
The rationale the by-stipulation approach relies upon seems to be the following. Suppose a free 
particle in Hamiltonian classical mechanics. If the equation that describes such a system turn out 
non-invariant under time reversal, the only responsible for the non-invariance would be the change 
of the chosen direction for the time coordinate. But the choice of a direction for the time coordinate 
is matter of convention, since it just says something about the perspective from which the system 
will be described. But a change in our way to describe a system (or to write the equation down) 
should not induce a physical change. So, a free particle in Hamiltonian classical mechanics cannot 
be non-time-reversal invariant. We are therefore entitled to declare that free equations of motion 
must be time-reversal invariant. The source of this reasoning, I submit, is that time-reversal 
symmetry was regarded as a rule-prescribing principle in Hamiltonian classical mechanics, 
guiding not only our understanding of the time-reversal transformation, but also the difference, for 
instance, between free-interaction and ordinary evolutions. 
A by-discovery approach is not committed to such a rule-prescribing framework, but it will 
rather consider that there is no reason to stipulate that even free equations must be time-reversal 
invariant. In this approach, time-reversal symmetry is not prior to the dynamics, so that it cannot 
act as a constraint. In accordance with this, a free general equation might be non-time-reversal 
invariant, allowing cases of time-reversal violation even where we are dealing with free particles. 
This could be a bit surprising at first sight, but it follows from adopting a by-discovery view: 
nothing in the theory forces us to claim that always a free general equation of motion will turn out 
time-reversal invariant. This will depend on the details of the dynamics, which, conforming to this 
approach, is developed independently of its symmetries. The only way to avoid this result, if 
considered as undesirable, is to shift gears and to endorse the by-stipulation approach. 
A clear example where this heuristic facet is guiding different conceptualizations of time 
reversal is in the discussion on time reversal in classical electromagnetism. The following brief 
presentation will be enough to contrast both views (for a good review of different positions, see 
Peterson 2015). On the one hand, David Albert (2000) has argued that classical electromagnetism 
is not time-reversal invariant because the Ampere’s circuital law comes out non-time-reversal 
invariant. The explanation is the following. The magnetic field is a basic property of 
electromagnetism and basic properties (for ontological reasons) do not change sign under time 
reversal. It follows that, according to Albert, time reversal cannot change the sign of the magnetic 
field, so it is left invariant under time reversal. This fact renders Ampere’s circuital law non-time-
reversal invariant, since the right side keeps the positive sign, whereas a negative sign appears on 
the left. Putting aside Albert’s concrete arguments, his rationale is only possible if a by-stipulation 
approach is discarded: since time-reversal invariance is not stipulated, there is enough room to 
make a philosophical case in favor of an alternative representation of time reversal in classical 
electromagnetism, where time-reversal symmetry rather depends on the dynamics’ details and on 
our ontological analysis of magnitudes within a theory. 
On the other, Frank Arntzenius and Hillary Greaves (2009) have brought up an alternative 
account that challenges Albert’s –the “textbook account”. According to it, the properties of time 
reversal do not depend on whether magnitudes are basic or non-basic, but on postulating that the 
 
contingently asymmetric. Contrarily, conforming to the by-discover approach general laws might turn out non-time-
reversal invariant, which is equivalent to claim that their solutions are either compatible with −𝑡 or +𝑡, but not both. 
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(free, fundamental) equations are invariant and then figuring out the right transformation that keeps 
them invariant. In their words: 
“Next let us consider the electric and magnetic fields. How do they transform under 
time reversal? Well, the standard procedure is simply to assume that classical 
electromagnetism is invariant under time reversal. From this assumption of time 
reversal invariance of the theory (…) it is inferred that the electric field E is invariant 
under time reversal (…) while the magnetic field B flips sign under time reversal” 
(Arntzenius and Greaves 2009: 6) 
So, our ontological considerations regarding the magnetic and electric field don’t matter any 
longer. Whether they change sign under time reversal will depend on whether their sign’s changing 
helps to keep the theory invariant or not. Note that now time-reversal symmetry acts as a rule-
prescribing principle for modeling the right time-reversal transformation. This is a clear case of 
the by-stipulation approach, which leaves no room for alternatives that lead to time-reversal 
violations at the level of general laws. 
Summing up. Among philosophers and physicists there seem to be at least two opposing views 
regarding the status of symmetries in physics: by-stipulation and by-discovery. In this section, I 
have argued that the confrontation is also present in our characterization of time reversal, which 
not only affects conceptually how time reversal should be understood (either as a by-stipulation 
symmetry or by-discovery), but also guides the formal implementation of time reversal within a 
physical theory (for instance, in the case of electromagnetism). 
5. Final Remarks 
I have argued that any conceptual elucidation of time reversal must start off by giving an answer 
to three questions: 
(i) Is time-reversal symmetry predicated of general dynamical laws or particular 
models?  
(ii) Is time to be understood relationally or substantively? 
(iii) Is time-reversal symmetry stipulated or discovered in physical theories? 
These questions, I have shown, reveal three facets –modal, metaphysical, and heuristic. These 
facets were shown to admit of divergent views. It is the existence of these divergencies that feeds 
the idea of a disunified concept of time reversal in physical theories: time reversal can be said in 
so many ways, and can be instantiated so variedly, that there can hardly be a unified concept of 
straightforward or obvious implementation. This conclusion somehow puts the discussion upside 
down: instead of beginning by looking into our physical theories to elucidate and justify the right 
time-reversal transformation, one should rather begin by providing an answer to those three 
questions. To a reasonable extent, such answers serve as the conceptual grounds for time reversal 
in physics.  
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Yet, this disunity is not meant to be absolute, but some partial unifications can be eventually 
reached. For instance, the by-stipulation approach, it can be argued, seems to rely on a relationalist-
like reasoning to justify the postulation of a symmetry: after all, we are dealing with changes in 
the description of a physical situation. The by-discovery approach seems to be more friendly for 
the substantivalist since she can accept that in some situations, free, fundamental equations of 
motion can be non-time-reversal invariant, leaving the door open for an asymmetry of time itself 
(whatever it comes to be conceptualized). Arguments like these can yield some partial unifications 
of time reversal. These lines of inquiry remain open for future work. 
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